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11633

AGENT SERVICE RECORD

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCE/METHOD/EXEMPTION 3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2008

1. AGENT CRYPTONYM: STERANT-1
2. PROJECT IDENTIFICATION: STERANT
3. AGENT RECRUITED BY: Subject was originally contacted and developed by IDENTITY A, and later recruited by IDENTITY B. The initial contacts and recruitment took place in September 1946.
4. CAPACITY IN WHICH THE AGENT SERVED: During the nearly ten years of association with KUBARK STERANT-1 has served in almost every phase of agent activity. This has included: radio operator, intelligence collection, translation, research, advisor, spotter, recruiter, agent instructor, and chief agent.
5. RATE OF PAY: At the time the subject was terminated he was receiving a monthly salary of US\$230.00, all of which was paid in the field, part in Japanese yen and part in Military Payment Certificates (MPC). STERANT-1 was given a one-time termination bonus of US\$3,000.00 per instructions from Headquarters. This sum as well as the agent's accumulated savings of U.S.\$2,300.00 was paid in the field in Japanese yen. There is no outstanding financial obligation owed to this agent.
6. OTHER COMMITMENTS: None.
7. AGENT DISMISSED BY: [] on 8 June 1956
8. REASONS FOR DISMISSAL: With the exception of the STRESIDENT operation STERANT-1's entire time with KUBARK had been spent in dealing with Mongolian operations and other related activity. With the termination of the last Mongolian operation this unit found itself hard put to keep the agent occupied. Repeated requests to Headquarters and other KUBARK units did not bring forth an offer of employment elsewhere within KUBARK. In addition STERANT-1 had never been directed to build access in other fields, so the agent, in time, became excess baggage, an agent who had to be terminated because he was no longer in a position to further our efforts against our assigned targets.
9. SECURITY RISKS: Over the years of very close association with our operations STERANT-1 has acquired considerable knowledge of our objectives, techniques, and personnel. The subject's knowledge of our operations is somewhat limited, yet that which he does possess is in great detail. A redeeming factor here is that in the past four years

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STERANT-1 has been working on operations which are now dead through abortion or termination - in addition, most of the operations are probably already known to the opposition. STERANT-1 is aware of the true name and nature of KUBARK. All of which means is that if STERANT-1 were to go to the Japanese, the Chinese Nationalists, or to the Chinese Communists the most he could do would be to report on operations which are already known to them, however, he could identify the sponsor and many of its staff personnel. STERANT-1 knows many KUBARK case officers by true name and has probably collected considerable BI on these individuals. Headquarters is in the best position to prepare a roster of personnel whom he can identify, if such a listing is thought necessary. It is the case officer's opinion that STERANT-1 will not reveal his past KUBARK connection to either the Chinese Nationalists or to the Chinese Communists. However, there is a very real possibility that the agent will reestablish his former JIS connections, and in so doing he would be forced to reveal in part or in toto his past KUBARK activities. The possibility that STERANT-1 will go to the Japanese is made more real by the fact that the subject is not equipped nor is he capable of supporting himself in any other manner than by working in the field of intelligence - the JIS is the only service readily available to him.

10. IS THIS AGENT RECOMMENDED FOR REUSE: Yes. In the case of a shooting war on the mainland STERANT-1, if still available, would be of value in recontacting Mongolian agents and friends who in turn might be of benefit to KUBARK. It is very doubtful that the agent will ever build any access here in Japan which could be exploited by KUBARK. If the agent does recontact JIS it would probably be on a very low level and uninteresting to us as a possible penetration.
11. MANNER OF DISMISSAL: Since the termination of ☐ in February 1956 STERANT-1 has been aware that he would be terminated. The agent and case officer have discussed this termination many times and the agent was prepared for eventual termination, yet on the day that the subject was informed of the actual termination it came as a shock. STERANT-1 did not want to be terminated, however, he was professional enough to realize that once the decision was made there was little or nothing he could do about it. STERANT-1 was told that his services were no longer needed for reason that the type of operations in which he could assist had all dried up. The agent was told that it was hoped that sometime in the future we could recontact and rehire him, but for now the agent was to consider himself terminated. STERANT-1 accepted this, but he has high hopes that he will be recontacted in the near future. STERANT-1's attitude toward the case officer and to KUBARK was not

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Enclosure (1) to
A- , dated

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the very best, but in view of the fact that the agent was being terminated after almost ten years of employment through no fault of his own a little bitterness could be expected. STERANT-1 did not threaten the organization, nor did he plead for any special consideration. The actual termination took place during two personal meetings between the subject and the case officer.

12. LETTER OF TERMINATION SIGNED: No letter of termination was signed, nor was there an LCPLUTTER examination given.

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SEPARATE COVER ENVELOPE

(2) to FJTA- , dated

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IDENTITIES

IDENTITY A:

IDENTITY B:

IDENTITY C:

PAI Ching-ju

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